Board age and gender diversity: a test of competing linear and curvilinear predictions by Ali, Muhammad et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Ali, Muhammad, Ng, Yin Lu, & Kulik, Carol
(2014)
Board age and gender diversity : a test of competing linear and curvilinear
predictions.
Journal of Business Ethics, 125(3), pp. 497-512.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/63826/
c© Copyright 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
The final publication is available at Springer via
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1930-9
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1930-9
Board Age and Gender Diversity                                                                                             1 
 
 
BOARD AGE AND GENDER DIVERSITY: A TEST OF COMPETING LINEAR AND 
CURVILINEAR PREDICTIONS   
 
 
Suitable Section: Corporate Governance 
 
 
 
Muhammad Ali 
Queensland University of Technology 
QUT Business School 
2 George Street 
Brisbane, Queensland 4001, Australia 
Tel: +61 7 3138 2661 
Fax: +61 7 3138 1313 
e-mail: m3.ali@qut.edu.au 
 
 
 
 
Yin Lu Ng 
HELP University 
Department of Psychology 
Level 8, Wisma HELP 
Jalan Dungun, 50490 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
Tel: + 603 2711 2000 
Fax: +603 2711 2236 
email: ngyl@help.edu.my 
 
 
 
 
Carol T. Kulik 
University of South Australia 
School of Management 
GPO Box 2471, Adelaide, South Australia 
Tel: +61 8 8302 7378 
Fax: +61 8 8302 0512 
e-mail: carol.kulik@unisa.edu.au 
 
 
Board Age and Gender Diversity                                                                                             2 
BOARD AGE AND GENDER DIVERSITY: A TEST OF COMPETING LINEAR AND 
CURVILINEAR PREDICTIONS   
 
 
Abstract 
 
The inconsistent findings of past board diversity research demand a test of competing linear and 
curvilinear diversity-performance predictions. This research focuses on board age and gender 
diversity, and presents a positive linear prediction based on resource dependence theory, a 
negative linear prediction based on social identity theory, and an inverted U-shaped curvilinear 
prediction based on the integration of resource dependence theory with social identity theory. 
The predictions were tested using archival data on 288 large organizations listed on the 
Australian Securities Exchange, with a one-year time lag between diversity (age and gender) and 
performance (employee productivity and return on assets). The results indicate a positive linear 
relationship between gender diversity and employee productivity, a negative linear relationship 
between age diversity and return on assets, and an inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship 
between age diversity and return on assets. The findings provide additional evidence on the 
business case for board gender diversity and refine the business case for board age diversity.  
 
Key terms: Board diversity, Age diversity, Gender diversity, Performance, Competing 
Predictions  
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Introduction 
Corporate boards are responsible for governance and overseeing the overall direction and 
functioning of the organization (Carroll and Buchholtz, 2011). They manage relationships with 
multiple stakeholders, such as shareholders, employees, government, and communities 
(Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2011). There is a growing understanding that a 
demographically diverse board is best positioned to address the concerns of diverse stakeholders 
(Carroll and Buchholtz, 2011). Recent changes in corporate governance laws, rules and 
regulations on board composition have catalyzed a discussion on board demographic diversity 
(Schwartz-Ziv, 2012). For instance, some countries have introduced gender diversity quotas as a 
strategy to improve the representation of women in boards (Branson, 2012). The examples 
include Norway, France and Spain with 40%, Belgium with 33%, and Malaysia with 30% 
women’s quotas (Deloitte, 2011). Other countries have introduced rules and regulations to 
indirectly push companies toward greater diversity on their boards. For example, the Australian 
Securities Exchange requires companies to adopt and disclose a diversity policy, and report on 
their gender diversity initiatives and gender proportions at all levels including boards (Australian 
Securities Exchange, 2010). Similarly, the US Securities and Exchange Commission requires 
companies to disclose whether (and how) the nominating committee considered diversity in the 
director nomination process (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2012). 
 These push initiatives were driven by social justice motives. The countries adopting them 
hoped to develop just societies in which women and men would experience equal opportunity at 
all levels. Push initiatives have improved board diversity in the last few years (Australian 
Institute of Company Directors, 2012a). However, at the current pace, it will take several 
decades before we achieve a decent level of board demographic diversity (Ellemers et al., 2012). 
Board Age and Gender Diversity                                                                                             4 
Board diversity can experience further sustained improvements if there is also a pull factor in 
place – evidence that diversity brings economic returns (the business case for diversity). 
Empirical studies have examined the business case for various dimensions of demographic 
diversity in corporate boards. The focus of that body of literature has been mainly on board 
gender diversity (for a review, see Rhode and Packel, 2010; Simpson et al., 2010; Terjesen et al., 
2009). The findings of that body of research have been inconsistent. Some studies found a 
positive linear association of gender diversity with various performance measures (e.g., Bear et 
al., 2010; Bonn, 2004; Bonn et al., 2004; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Mahadeo et al., 
2012; Nguyen and Faff, 2006; Srinidhi et al., 2011). Another body of research found a negative 
linear relationship between board gender diversity and performance (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Bøhren and Strøm, 2010; Dobbin and Jung, 2011; Haslam et al., 2010). Other studies 
found that board gender diversity did not have a significant relationship with outcomes (e.g., 
Carter et al., 2010; Jhunjhunwala and Mishra, 2012; Shukeri et al., 2012; Wang and Clift, 2009) 
(see Appendix for details on some gender diversity studies). 
The business case for board age diversity has not attracted much attention by researchers, 
but this small body of research also found mixed results. On the positive side, high board age 
diversity is associated with large donations for not-for-profit organizations (Siciliano, 1996) and 
high return on assets for for-profit organizations (Mahadeo et al., 2012). Similarly, low average 
age of directors (which suggests high age diversity as most board members are over 50) is linked 
to high market value of an organization compared to its book value (Bonn et al., 2004). On the 
negative side, board age diversity is related to low corporate social performance (Hafsi and 
Turgut, 2013). However, other research indicates that board age diversity does not have a 
significant relationship with earnings per share (Jhunjhunwala and Mishra, 2012), return on 
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assets (Bonn et al., 2004), or return on equity (Bonn, 2004). The small body of research, with 
mixed findings, makes it unclear whether age-diverse boards improve organizational 
performance (see Appendix for details on some age diversity studies).  
The inconsistent findings suggest that future research should focus on competing 
predictions based on contrasting theories (Armstrong et al., 2001) and sophisticated models (van 
Knippenberg et al., 2011) such as curvilinear predictions with reverse causality tests (Ali et al., 
2011). This study aims to fill some of these research gaps. It endeavors to test contrasting 
theories through presenting and analyzing competing linear predictions on the relationship 
between diversity (age and gender) and performance. It also proposes and tests a refined 
curvilinear prediction between diversity (age and gender) and performance, and tests reverse 
causality. Specifically, we present a positive linear diversity-performance prediction using 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), a negative linear prediction based on 
social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978), and an inverted U-shaped curvilinear prediction based on 
the integration of resource dependence theory with social identity theory. We test these 
predictions using archival data on board diversity (age and gender) and performance 
(intermediate performance measure of employee productivity and financial performance measure 
of return on assets) of companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange. 
Competing Linear and Curvilinear Predictions 
Competing Linear Predictions 
Resource dependence theory states that the external environment of an organization influences 
that organization’s performance (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Organizations within a context are 
dependent on one another and other entities in that context. These external entities control 
important resources, and so they create challenges and uncertainties for organizations. For an 
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organization to be successful, its directors and managers must develop links with these entities to 
reduce that dependency and enable the organization to obtain needed resources (Hillman et al., 
2007).  
Organizations need diverse boards due to the important functions the board serves. 
Specifically, the board makes strategic decisions, develops links with external stakeholders (e.g., 
suppliers, consumers), and helps to engage talent from the labor market. Diversity can facilitate 
each of these functions. First, a diverse board can integrate a wider range of information to make 
more informed decisions (Hillman et al., 2000; van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). Younger 
directors tend to be highly educated (Hatfield, 2002) and familiar with new technologies 
(Jhunjhunwala and Mishra, 2012); older directors bring to the board valuable experience that 
they accumulated in the industry (Jhunjhunwala and Mishra, 2012; Li et al., 2011). The attributes 
of younger and older directors complement one another and the organization can leverage these 
differences to improve its strategic decision-making. For example, an organization that wants to 
expand into high-tech manufacturing can use the younger directors’ technological skills to 
identify startups operating in this space, and leverage the older directors’ experience to assess 
whether the startups are viable acquisition targets. Male and female directors possess different 
skills, knowledge, and perspectives; the integration of these different perspectives contributes to 
higher quality decisions (Rogelberg and Rumery, 1996). For instance, female directors may be 
more detail-focused (Stendardi et al., 2006) and risk-averse (Graham et al., 2002) than male 
directors. Integrating both male and female directors’ perspectives, an organization may be better 
positioned to critically weigh the risks and benefits associated with decisions to expand or shrink 
the business, make capital investments or adopt new processes.   
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 Second, board diversity helps create linkages with important external stakeholders, such 
as suppliers and consumers. Organizations may reduce uncertainties and dependencies if they 
capitalize on the full range of connections delivered by a diverse board (Miller and Triana, 2009; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). For example, younger directors may be more likely to know early 
career entrepreneurs, whereas older directors might be more likely to have senior contacts in 
established firms. Organizations that take advantage of these non-redundant ties will have greater 
access to suppliers of critical resources (e.g., information technology or raw materials) and 
reduce their dependency on individual suppliers (Miller and Triana, 2009). Similarly, male and 
female directors may help the organization to access a wider range of consumers. Compared to 
men’s networks, women’s networks are more diverse (containing both same-sex and cross-sex 
linkages) and are more likely to contain weak ties (Ibarra, 1992; Miller and Triana, 2009). Weak 
ties are particularly valuable to an organization because they deliver non-redundant information 
that can be critical to a firm’s success (Granovetter, 1973). The different networks maintained by 
male and female directors give the organization access to more market segments, enabling the 
organization to serve a wider range of customers. Organizations with diverse boards are able to 
access critical resources from diverse suppliers and develop products valued by diverse 
consumer groups (Fredette et al., 2006), and therefore are likely to achieve greater bottom line 
benefits (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2003). 
Third, a diverse board signals the organization's commitment to diversity which may help 
the organization to attract and retain individuals from diverse demographic backgrounds 
(Spence, 1973). Female and young job applicants may be more attracted to organizations that 
have a diverse board because such a board signals that the organization is diversity-conscious, is 
likely to encourage diversity in its hiring and promotion practices, and values the contributions 
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of its diverse members (Mattis, 2000). The presence of female directors signals growth and 
advancement opportunities for women within the organization, which inspires lower-level 
female workers (Kurtulus and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012). Similarly, younger directors may 
serve as role models and inspiration to young newcomers. Research suggests that a diverse board 
helps the organization to attract and retain diverse talents (Fredette et al., 2006; Stephenson, 
2004). These talents may contribute to better organizational performance and help the 
organization to achieve a sustained competitive advantage. 
In sum, diverse boards may improve strategic decisions, expand networks, and engage 
talent, which may help organizations to become productive and financially successful. Past 
research demonstrated a positive link between board diversity and financial performance. For 
instance, Mahadeo et al. (2012) studied the effects of board age and gender diversity on 
performance. The findings indicate a positive relationship between board diversity (age and 
gender) and return on assets. Similarly, Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) examined the 
effects of board gender diversity on organizational performance. The authors found that board 
gender diversity is positively associated with Tobin’s Q (market capitalization divided by the 
value of total assets; a forward-looking measure of organizational performance). Thus, it is 
proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a positive relationship between board diversity (age and 
gender) and organizational performance. 
Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) suggests that individuals use demographic attributes, 
such as age and gender, to categorize self and others into social groups. In order for individuals 
to maintain a positive self-identity, they maximize the differences between in-group members 
(similar others) and out-group members (dissimilar others). As a result of self-categorization 
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processes (Turner et al., 1987), individuals engage in behaviors, such as stereotyping (Loden and 
Rosener, 1991; van Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007), that impede group functioning. 
Specifically, members of a diverse group are more likely to experience a lack of cohesion, 
communication and cooperation, and more dissatisfaction and conflict (Chatman and Flynn, 
2001; Jehn et al., 1999; Pelled, 1996; Shapcott et al., 2006; Triandis et al., 1994).   
Consistent with social identity theory, age and gender diverse boards are likely to create 
in-groups and out-groups, and develop “us vs. them” perceptions among its members (Brown 
and Turner, 1981). Older (or younger) directors are more likely to interact with other board 
members from the same age group, finding that same-age group individuals are easier to interact 
with and more likely to share their values and expectations (Twenge et al., 2010). In contrast, 
out-group members are perceived as less trustworthy, more dishonest, and less cooperative 
(Brewer, 1979). Because of this positive bias toward one’s own group and negative attitudes 
toward the out-group, directors with different demographic attributes are less likely to openly 
communicate with one another. For example, in-group and out-group separation makes female 
directors less likely to fully participate in male-dominated board meetings (Tuggle et al., 2011). 
Thus the proposed benefits of diversity (e.g., a wider range of perspectives, improved decision-
making and creativity) are less likely to materialize (Richard et al., 2013), and the negative 
processes (e.g., dissatisfaction and conflict) are likely to negatively influence the organization’s 
overall performance.  
Empirical research supports the argument that board gender and age diversity is 
negatively associated with organizational performance. For instance, Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
found that board gender diversity is linked to low Tobin’s Q and return on assets, whereas Hafsi 
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and Turgut (2013) found a negative relationship between board age diversity and corporate 
social performance. Thus, it is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a negative relationship between board diversity (age and 
gender) and organizational performance. 
An Integration: Curvilinear Prediction  
Integrating resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) with social identity theory 
(Tajfel, 1978), we propose an inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship between board diversity 
and organizational performance. The theoretical integration suggests that the impact of diversity 
on outcomes depends on the level of diversity (Ali et al., 2011; Richard et al., 2002; Richard et 
al., 2007). 
 In line with resource dependence theory, organizations that have a homogenous board of 
directors may display low performance because they lack a broad portfolio of skills and 
expertise. For instance, a board that is dominated by older directors may lack knowledge about 
current technologies (Jhunjhunwala and Mishra, 2012). Further, with a homogenous board, the 
organization may have multiple connections with a narrow set of external constituents (e.g., a 
particular customer group; Hillman et al., 2009). For instance, in the absence of female directors, 
a male-dominated board may have few connections with female stakeholders. However, as 
diversity increases, access to resources and information (e.g., skills and knowledge) increases, 
which leads to improved organizational performance (Li et al., 2011). At low levels of diversity, 
minority members have greater opportunities to interact with majority members (Blau, 1977). 
Frequent contact (and the resultant perceived support; South et al., 1982) between minority and 
majority members may lead to improved problem-solving and creativity. The inclusion of at least 
one minority member (e.g., a female director or a young director) contributes to improved 
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performance (Carter et al., 2003; Rogelberg and Rumery, 1996). In sum, skewed boards are 
beneficial to organizations and the benefits continue to increase from low to moderate levels of 
diversity (Knouse and Dansby, 1999).  
However, when diversity increases further, members of a moderately diverse board (e.g., 
25% female directors or young directors) are likely to categorize themselves and others based on 
demographic attributes (Lau and Murnighan, 1998). Board members of the same demographic 
group are categorized as in-group and others are categorized as out-group. Consistent with social 
identity theory (Tajfel, 1978), board members are likely to perceive in-group members as 
superior to out-group members and hold unfavorable attitudes toward out-group members. As a 
result of psychological categorization, directors on a diverse board are likely to engage in 
destructive behaviors, such as decreased intergroup communication (Kravitz, 2003) and 
increased intergroup conflict (Pelled, 1996). Board effectiveness is likely to be negatively 
affected by unproductive intergroup interactions which will then negatively influence 
organizational performance. From moderate to high levels of diversity (i.e. 25-50% female 
directors or young directors), the adverse effects of diversity intensify due to increasingly salient 
categorizations (Ali et al., 2011). The high representation of female directors or young directors 
may create a sense of threat among the majority directors (male/older), which will then generate 
greater competition (Blalock, 1967) and intergroup conflict (Pelled, 1996). The increased 
competition and conflict may lead to poor decisions and low performance.    
In sum, the effect of board diversity on organizational performance is largely dependent 
on the level of diversity: from low to moderate levels of diversity, diversity will be beneficial, 
but from moderate to high levels of diversity, diversity will be detrimental. No prior research 
investigated a curvilinear relationship between board diversity and performance. However, past 
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research found some support for an inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship between diversity 
and performance at other levels. For instance, Ali et al.’s (2011) findings indicate an inverted U-
shaped curvilinear relationship between organizational gender diversity and employee 
productivity. Thus, it is proposed: 
Hypothesis 3: There will be an inverted U-shaped relationship between board diversity 
(age and gender) and organizational performance. 
Methods 
We used archival data to test the competing linear predictions and the curvilinear prediction 
between board diversity (age and gender) and performance (employee productivity and return on 
assets), with a one-year time lag between diversity (2011) and performance (2012). 
Sample and Data Collection 
The population of this research comprises for-profit large organizations across nine industries in 
Australia. Australian laws prohibit discrimination based on demographics, including age and 
gender. However, Australian antidiscrimination laws do not require a minimum representation of 
young people or women on the boards of organizations. Australian organizations have autonomy 
in terms of the targets they set and the programs they develop to reach those targets (Strachan et 
al., 2010). Recent Australian Securities Exchange guidelines on diversity initiatives have helped 
increase the proportion of board roles held by women from 8.8 % to 14.6 % in the last four years 
(Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2012b). The average age of Australian board 
members is around 60-69 years for men and around 50-59 years for women (Australian Institute 
of Company Directors, 2012b).  
The initial sample comprised 2164 organizations listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) in October 2012. Four hundred and forty-six organizations with over 100 
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employees were selected for this research (e.g., Wang and Clift, 2009). The small organizations 
were excluded because public databases are less likely to have complete data on age and gender 
diversity of their boards. Missing data on board member age reduced the sample size to 288 
organizations. Data on age and gender diversity for 2011 (obtained from the Orbis database) 
were matched with data on employee productivity for 2012 (data on operating revenue were 
obtained from the Osiris database and data on number of employees were obtained from the 
DatAnalysis database) and return on assets for 2012 (obtained from the Osiris database). Data on 
control variables were obtained as follows: organization size (DatAnalysis), organization age 
(Osiris), organization type in terms of holding/subsidiary or stand-alone (OneSource), and 
industry (ASX website). 
The final sample of 288 organizations was diverse in terms of size and industry, and 
demonstrated a range of board member age and gender diversity. The sample organizations 
ranged in size from 101 to 190,000 employees. They represented nine industry groups based on 
Standard Industrial Classification codes; no organization belonged to the Public Administration 
category. The most frequent industry groups were: Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas, and Sanitary Services (24% of the organizations); Mining (18%); Services (16%); 
Construction (15%), and Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (12%).Women’s representation on 
the corporate boards ranged from 0 to 5 women (mean 0.82). Ages of board members ranged 
from 34 years to 89 years (mean 58.9).  
Australian Context 
Gender diversity is the most salient dimension of demographic diversity in Australia (Cotter, 
2004; Strachan et al., 2004). The Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 requires employers to 
provide equal opportunities to men and women, and encourages employers to improve women’s 
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representation (Workplace Gender Equality Agency, 2012a). The law requires non-public sector 
employers with 100 or more employees to report the gender composition of their workforce and 
boards, and their gender diversity initiatives, to the Workplace Gender Equality Agency on a 
yearly basis (Workplace Gender Equality Agency, 2012b). Recently, age diversity of board 
members is gaining importance (Stuart, 2009), with most present board members described as 
“pale, male and stale” (Shand, 2012, para. 2). The Age Discrimination Act 2004 aims at ensuring 
equal opportunities to all people regardless of their age (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004).  
Measures 
Outcomes. Scholars recommend using multiple measures of performance when 
investigating the impact of a variable on organizational effectiveness (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). 
This study uses objective performance measures of employee productivity and return on assets 
(e.g., Mahadeo et al., 2012; Shrader et al., 1997). Employee productivity was calculated using 
operating revenue (obtained from Osiris database) and number of employees (obtained from 
DatAnalysis database). Operating revenue was divided by number of employees and the 
resulting values were transformed using a natural logarithm (Huselid, 1995; Konrad and Mangel, 
2000). Data on return on assets were obtained from the Osiris database. Osiris calculates return 
on assets as profits or loss before tax divided by total assets (Osiris, 2012). The two measures 
can provide insight into how board diversity impacts an organization's use of its human resources 
(employee productivity) and its financial resources (return on assets).  
Predictors. This research operationalizes age and gender diversity as separate dimensions 
of diversity, because scholars advise against aggregating multiple dimensions of diversity into a 
single index (Harrison and Klein, 2007). Age diversity was calculated using the coefficient of 
variation formula. The standard deviation of board members’ ages was divided by their mean 
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age. Larger standard deviation (larger age differences between board members) and lower mean 
age (higher representation of young board members) would generate higher age diversity values. 
Gender diversity was calculated using Blau’s index of heterogeneity for categorical variables 
(Blau, 1977). As per Blau’s index, heterogeneity equals 1- ∑pi2, where pi represents the fractions 
of the population in each category. Blau’s index is a continuous scale (Buckingham and 
Saunders, 2004) that increases as the representation of men and women in the organization’s 
workforce becomes more equal. The index ranges from zero representing complete homogeneity 
(0/100 gender proportions) to 0.5 representing maximum gender diversity (50/50 gender 
proportions). 
Controls. The analyses controlled for the effects of organization size, organization age, 
organization type, and industry type on performance. Compared to small organizations, large 
organizations may have more potential to perform better because of economies of scale. Large 
organizations are also likely to have diverse boards (Carter et al., 2003; Wang and Clift, 2009). 
Consistent with previous research, organization size was operationalized as the total number of 
employees (Alexander et al., 1995; Jackson et al., 1991). Organization age may have an impact 
on performance. Compared to old organizations, new organizations with fewer formalized 
structures may be better positioned to capitalize on the benefits of diversity such as creativity and 
innovation. Organization age was operationalized as the number of years since the organization 
was founded (Jackson et al., 1991; Perry-Smith and Blum, 2000). Organizations that are holding 
companies or subsidiaries, compared to stand-alone organizations, may benefit from the 
combined financial resources (Richard et al., 2003). A dummy variable called “Organization 
type” was created with “0” representing “Holding or subsidiary” and “1” representing “Stand-
alone.” 
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The effect of diversity on performance can vary across manufacturing and services 
industries, because of the different level of interaction among employees, and between 
employees and customers, in the two industry types (Ali et al., 2011; Godthelp and Glunk, 2003). 
Industry type also predicts the level of age and gender diversity of boards (Brammer et al., 2007; 
Hillman et al., 2007; Kang et al., 2007). The nine SIC industry groups of the sample 
organizations were categorized into manufacturing and services. “Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services,” “Wholesale Trade,” “Retail Trade,” 
“Finance, Insurance and Real Estate,” and “Services” made up the services category. 
“Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing,” “Mining,” “Construction,” and “Manufacturing” made up 
the manufacturing category (Richard et al., 2007). A dummy variable called “Industry type” was 
created with “1” representing manufacturing and “0” representing services. 
Results 
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients for all variables. 
Multicollinearity does not seem to be an issue because of low correlations among controls and 
predictor variables. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
We used hierarchical multiple regression to test the three hypotheses. The predictor 
variables of age diversity and gender diversity were centered to reduce multicollinearity with the 
squared terms (Aiken and West, 1991). Hypothesis 1 proposed that age diversity and gender 
diversity would be positively related to performance. Hypothesis 2 proposed that age diversity 
and gender diversity would be negatively related to performance. To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, 
employee productivity and return on assets were separately regressed on age diversity and 
gender diversity. The control variables were entered in Step 1, then age diversity and gender 
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diversity were entered in Step 2 (see Tables 2 and 3). The results shown under Model 2 in Table 
2 indicate that age diversity did not have a significant effect on employee productivity (β = -.09, 
n.s.). However, gender diversity had a significant positive effect on employee productivity (β = 
.12, p < .05). Together age diversity and gender diversity accounted for an additional 2% of 
variance in employee productivity. The results shown under Model 2 in Table 3 indicate that age 
diversity had a significant negative effect on return on assets (β = -.18, p < .01). However, 
gender diversity did not have a significant effect on return on assets (β = -.07, n.s.). An additional 
3% of variance in return on assets was accounted for by age diversity and gender diversity. The 
results suggest that both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 were partially supported: gender 
diversity had a significant positive effect on employee productivity, and age diversity had a 
significant negative effect on return on assets. 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
Hypothesis 3 proposed that age and gender diversity would have an inverted U-shaped 
curvilinear relationship with performance. The squared terms of age diversity
2
 and gender 
diversity
2
 were created to test this curvilinear relationship. To test Hypothesis 3, employee 
productivity and return on assets were again separately regressed on age diversity and gender 
diversity. The control variables were entered in step 1; age and gender diversity were entered in 
Step 2; and age diversity
2
 and gender diversity
2 
were entered in Step 3. The results shown under 
Model 3 in Table 2 indicate that age diversity
2
 (β = -.03, n.s.) and gender diversity2 (β = -.04, 
n.s.) did not have a significant effect on employee productivity. The results shown under Model 
3 in Table 3 suggest that age diversity
2
 significantly affected return on assets (β = -.22, p < .01); 
age diversity
2
 and gender diversity
2 
accounted for an additional 3% of variance in return on 
assets. The negative coefficient on age diversity
2
 indicates an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
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However, gender diversity did not have a significant curvilinear relationship with return on 
assets (β = .01, n.s.) (see under Model 3 in Table 3). Therefore, partial support was found for 
Hypothesis 3; only age diversity had an inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship with return on 
assets. 
We plotted the effects of age and gender diversity on performance. Figure 1 presents the 
regression line for the positive linear effect of gender diversity (Blau’s index ranged from 0 to 
.50) on employee productivity. Figure 2 presents the regression lines for the negative linear and 
inverted U-shaped curvilinear effects of age diversity (coefficient of variation ranged from 0 to 
.45) on return on assets. The inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship was weakly positive at 
low levels of age diversity. The return on assets increased from -.22 (age diversity = .00) to 4.76 
(age diversity = .10). At higher levels of diversity, the relationship became stronger and 
progressively more negative. Return on assets decreased from a peak of 4.76 (age diversity = 
.10) to -59.42 (age diversity = .45). 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
Reverse Causality and Analyses without Controls 
To improve the rigor of our analyses, we performed the reverse causality test and reran the 
reported regression analyses without controls. Organizations with high financial performance 
levels (e.g., high return on assets) may have more resources to attract young directors and female 
directors leading to high board diversity. To eliminate this possibility of reverse causality 
between diversity and performance (i.e. performance  diversity), we tested the impact of return 
on assets in 2010 on board diversity in 2011 (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008). We separately 
regressed board age diversity and board gender diversity on return on assets, after controlling for 
organization size, organization age, organization type and industry type. The results of these 
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regression analyses indicate that return on assets did not predict board age diversity (β = -.03, 
n.s.) or board gender diversity (β = -.04, n.s.). We could not perform reverse causality tests for 
employee productivity because 2010 data on number of employees for most organizations are 
not publicly available. Moreover, multicollinearity among predictors and controls may 
contaminate the results (Becker, 2005). Therefore, we repeated the regression analyses reported 
in Tables 2 and 3 without control variables. In the absence of control variables, gender diversity 
(β = .17, p < .01) continued to significantly affect employee productivity, and age diversity (β = -
.18, p < .01) and age diversity
2
 (β = -.20, p < .01) continued to significantly affect return on 
assets. 
Discussion 
The main objectives of testing competing linear and curvilinear predictions on the impact of 
board diversity (age and gender) on multiple measures of performance (employee productivity 
and return on assets), with a one-year time lag between diversity and performance, were: (1) to 
provide additional evidence on the relationship between board diversity (age and gender) and 
performance; and (2) to perform a rigorous test of the curvilinear relationship between both 
board age and gender diversity and performance that may reconcile some of the inconsistent 
findings of past research. The results indicate a positive linear board gender diversity-employee 
productivity relationship, a negative linear board age diversity-return on assets relationship, and 
an inverted U-shaped curvilinear board age diversity-return on assets relationship. 
Linear Effects of Gender Diversity and Age Diversity 
The results indicate a positive linear relationship between board gender diversity and employee 
productivity. The findings support resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and 
suggest that a gender-balanced board enjoys a mix of resources that can help improve the 
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operating revenue of an organization, leading to high employee productivity. Applying historical 
subjective standards (Cohen, 1988), 2% of variance constitutes a “small” effect. But the 
economic impact of increased gender diversity is considerable (Cortina and Landis, 2009). 
Keeping all other variables at their mean values, employee productivity increased by $23,200 (on 
average) with every five point increase in gender diversity on Blau’s index (e.g., from .10 to .15). 
These results both support and build upon prior research. While the positive board gender 
diversity-performance findings are consistent with some prior research (e.g., Bonn, 2004; Bonn 
et al., 2004; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2003; Mahadeo et al., 2012; 
Srinidhi et al., 2011), they are also unique because the effects are found on employee 
productivity. No prior research on board gender diversity found a significant effect of board 
gender diversity on employee productivity. Thus the findings of this research strengthen the 
business case for board gender diversity by quantifying the impact of board gender diversity on 
employee productivity. The non-significant linear relationship between board gender diversity 
and return on assets can be explained by the two different types of performance measures 
studied. Employee productivity is an intermediate form of performance measure based on 
operating revenue and number of employees, whereas return on assets is a more distal financial 
performance measure (Richard et al., 2007). The resources provided by gender diversity, such as 
improved decision-making and diverse external linkages, may take time before they can have an 
impact on return on assets. Moreover, female directors are likely to be given operational 
responsibilities rather than strategic ones (Peterson and Philpot, 2007), and thus have minimal 
impact on the efficient use of assets (return on assets).  
The findings show a negative linear relationship between age diversity and return on 
assets. The results support social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) and indicate that age diversity can 
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lead to psychological groupings of younger board directors and older board directors, triggering 
negative group behaviors. With every five-point increase in board age diversity (e.g. from .05 to 
.10 on coefficient of variation), return on assets decreased by an average of 3.75, keeping all 
other variables studied at their mean values. The results of this study are consistent with Hafsi 
and Turgut’s (2013) study that found a negative association between age diversity and corporate 
social performance. Apart from that, our findings are inconsistent with past research which found 
either a significant positive relationship between age diversity and performance (e.g., Mahadeo 
et al., 2012; Siciliano, 1996) or a non-significant relationship between age diversity and 
performance (e.g., Jhunjhunwala and Mishra, 2012). The results of this study weaken the 
business case for age diversity put forward by prior research. However, the results should be 
interpreted in conjunction with the higher order curvilinear relationship found between age 
diversity and return on assets (discussed below). 
Overall, the results suggest different linear effects for age and gender. Gender diversity is 
the most salient dimension of diversity in Australia and is generally acknowledged and 
appreciated by practitioners (Mercer, 2012). Therefore, the psychological groupings into male 
and female board directors may be weaker than the resources gender diversity produces, leading 
to net positive effects on performance (Nielsen and Huse, 2010). This may not be the case for 
age diversity; it seems that the resources age diversity produces are weaker than the 
psychological categorization into old and young board directors, leading to negative group 
behaviors. For instance, older directors may see young directors violating norms that director 
positions should be “earned” with seniority (Lawrence, 1984). Older directors with these 
negative attitudes would be reluctant to fully engage the younger directors in the board’s 
decision making and strategic activities.      
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Inverted U-Shaped Age Diversity-Return on Assets Relationship 
The findings of this research suggest an inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship between age 
diversity and return on assets. The squared age diversity term refined the previously discussed 
negative board age diversity-return on assets relationship. The relationship was positive from 
homogeneity to low levels of age diversity (return on assets increased from -.22 at .00 level of 
age diversity to 4.76 at .10 age diversity) and then negative from low to high levels of age 
diversity (return on assets decreased from 4.76 at .10 age diversity to -59.42 at .45 age diversity). 
The negative relationship from low to high levels of age diversity was much stronger than the 
positive relationship from homogeneity to low levels of age diversity, which resulted in an 
overall negative linear relationship when the squared term was not included in the analysis. The 
inverted U-shaped relationship supports the integration of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978) with social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978). With strong theoretical arguments 
and a rigorous test of the curvilinear relationship, we were able to demonstrate that the most 
desirable level of age diversity is relatively low (about 10-15% younger members). A low level 
of age diversity brings valuable resources to the board table, but higher levels of age diversity 
trigger psychological groupings and negative group behaviors. 
Theoretical and Research Implications 
This research might be the first to propose competing linear and curvilinear predictions between 
board demographic diversity and performance based on contrasting theories. Therefore, the 
study’s findings have several theoretical and research implications. First, the findings provide 
indirect support to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and social identity 
theory (Tajfel, 1978). Direct support would require studying when and how diversity would 
produce mediating processes (resources and negative behaviors) and, in turn, how these 
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mediating processes impact performance. Second, this research also provides indirect support to 
the integration of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) with social identity 
theory (Tajfel, 1978). Our findings suggest that the impact of age diversity on performance is 
different at different levels of diversity. The support for an inverted U-shaped relationship calls 
for refinements of current theories or the development of new theories that can predict and 
explain a curvilinear relationship between diversity and performance. 
Third, this research fills important gaps in the diversity literature. It strengthens the 
business case for board gender diversity by providing the first evidence for a positive association 
between board gender diversity and employee productivity. It also adds to the small body of 
research that investigated the impact of board age diversity on performance. Moreover, it 
provides pioneering evidence for a curvilinear relationship between board age diversity and 
return on assets. Further research in this direction needs to focus on qualitative investigation of 
board processes, sampling the boards based on their levels of age diversity. Findings of these 
studies will provide detailed insights into why different levels of age diversity can have different 
effects, and why a low level of age diversity is optimal. Further, the curvilinear relationship 
found in this research can help reconcile some of the inconsistent findings of past research on 
board age diversity. For instance, the non-significant findings pertaining to the age diversity-
performance relationship (Bonn, 2004; Bonn et al., 2004; Jhunjhunwala and Mishra, 2012) may 
be attributed to the lack of focus on the curvilinear relationship -- the scholars did not include a 
squared age diversity term in their regression analyses. Similar tests of the curvilinear 
relationship between board racial diversity and performance should be conducted in countries 
such as the United States, where board racial diversity is higher than in Australia. Future 
research can also benefit from testing competing predictions in other contextual settings. The 
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relationship between board demographic diversity and performance may vary across countries 
because of different legal, social and cultural variables (Kang et al., 2007). For instance, research 
in Scandinavian countries with higher proportions of women on boards (Deloitte, 2011) and 
extremely low masculinity (where social roles and behaviors tend not to be based on gender) 
(Hofstede, 2001) may discover a curvilinear relationship between board gender diversity and 
performance. 
Practical Implications 
This research demonstrates an association between corporate board diversity and organizational 
financial performance. Many other factors, such as the national economy, global competition, 
and skill shortages, also impact financial performance (Carroll and Buchholtz, 2011). However, 
these distal factors may be difficult for organizations to influence. In contrast, organizations can 
exercise some control over their board’s diversity by carefully considering how new 
appointments will change the demographic mix of directors. Therefore, we develop some 
practical recommendations for current directors, nomination committees and shareholders to 
consider as they appoint new directors to their organization’s board. 
Overall, the results present a strong business case for increasing gender diversity on 
corporate boards. Higher levels of gender diversity were associated with higher levels of 
employee productivity, supporting a view that increasing gender diversity may be the key to 
higher productivity (Goldman Sachs, 2009). Improving productivity is especially important in 
Australia; the nation is consistently experiencing lower levels of productivity compared to other 
developed nations (Hannan and Gluyas, 2012). Therefore, when generating nominations for an 
open board position, organizations need to consider the effect the new appointment will have on 
gender diversity (Sweeney, 2012).  
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Organizations sometimes experience internal and external resistance to female 
appointments (Rhode and Packel, 2010), but our empirical evidence for a positive linear effect of 
gender diversity refutes stakeholder concerns that high female representation will deteriorate 
board quality (Grosvold et al., 2007). Our results also weaken the argument that having only one 
or two female directors has little benefit (Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al., 2011). The 
demonstrated value of even small increases in gender diversity is especially important in 
Australia where 38% of ASX-listed organizations do not have a single woman on their boards 
(Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2012b). A higher representation of women on boards 
is likely to have trickle down diversity effects, increasing the representation of women in senior 
management positions, management roles, and the overall workforce (Bilimoria, 2006; Kurtulus 
and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012; Terjesen and Singh, 2008).  
Broadening the shortlist to include more female nominees and appointing new female 
directors will increase gender diversity directly, but will also indirectly increase age diversity; 
the average age of female directors is lower than male directors (Australian Institute of Company 
Directors, 2012b). Our results suggest that adding a couple of young directors to an older board 
could produce an optimal level of age diversity which might generate higher return on assets. But 
organizations need to be mindful that excessive levels of age diversity might reflect insufficient 
experience and ultimately lower return on assets.  
In addition to gender and age diversity’s positive effects on organizational financial 
performance, demographic diversity may have further, less tangible, benefits. Diversity improves 
a board’s ability to address concerns of diverse shareholders (Carroll and Buchholtz, 2011). 
Female board members are likely to be highly educated, have non-business educational 
qualifications and have past work experience in high level positions (Hillman et al., 2002). As a 
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result, female board members are especially sensitive to ethical and social issues; they draw a 
board’s attention to the impact of decisions on community stakeholders (Burgess and Tharenou, 
2002; Luthar et al., 1997; Wang and Coffey, 1992; Williams, 2003). Similarly, young directors 
will have been sensitized to environmental concerns and corporate ethics during their education 
(Rowe, 2007); they are likely to encourage boards to consider environmental social 
responsibility and ethical issues. 
Limitations 
This study has three main limitations. First, the study design did not allow us to make strong 
inferences regarding the causal effect of board diversity on performance. We ensured temporal 
precedence of diversity over performance, controlled for the effects of multiple factors on the 
diversity-performance relationship, reran the analyses without control variables, and performed a 
test of reverse causality. However, a longitudinal research design with multiple data points 
mapping changes in diversity and performance over time would provide stronger evidence 
(Menard, 1991). Second, we could not take into account the impact of ethnic/racial diversity of 
board directors on performance. Some of the variance in employee productivity and return on 
assets might be attributed to racial diversity of board members. However, the very low levels of 
ethnic/racial diversity on Australian boards suggest that the results would not be different with a 
racial diversity variable included in the regression analyses. Third, unique aspects of the 
Australian context, including its emphasis on gender diversity (Strachan et al., 2010) and 
moderately masculine culture (where social roles and behaviors tend to be based on gender) 
(Hofstede, 2001), might have impacted the study findings. The diversity-performance 
relationship may show different strength or direction in other legal and cultural contexts. 
Similarly, some of the inconsistent results of the studies listed in Appendix might reflect 
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contextual variations such as state of the economy (developed vs. emerging), diversity dimension 
(gender vs. age), or outcome variables (financial performance vs. market performance vs. 
corporate social responsibility performance). For instance, Adams and Ferreira (2009) reported 
negative effects of board gender diversity in the U.S. (developed economy), whereas Mahadeo et 
al. (2012) reported positive effects of board age and gender diversity in Mauritius (emerging 
economy). 
Conclusion 
This study contributes to our understanding of the impact of board diversity (age and gender) on 
employee productivity and return on assets. The findings suggest that organizations that have a 
low level of board age diversity experience high levels of return on assets, and organizations that 
have high levels of board gender diversity experience high levels of employee productivity. 
These results add to the little evidence on the board age diversity-performance relationship, 
present pioneering evidence on the curvilinear board age diversity-performance relationship, and 
provide additional evidence on the board gender diversity-performance relationship. These 
results can help reconcile some of the inconsistent findings of past research on board age and 
gender diversity. The results also inform practice by indicating that different levels of different 
dimensions of diversity may be desirable. Moreover, the impact of diversity on performance may 
not be uniform across different dimensions of diversity. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Some board age and gender diversity studies 
 
Study 
Gender/Age 
Diversity  
Operation-
alization 
Performance 
Measures 
Empirical Settings 
and Final Sample 
Size 
Design and Methods Key Findings 
 
Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) 
 
Gender 
(Fractions) 
 
ROA, Tobin’s Q 
 
8,253 firm-years of 
data on 1,939 US 
firms 
 
 
Unbalanced panel data 
1996-2003  
 
Average effect of gender diversity on 
performance is negative 
Bear et al. (2010) Gender (no. of 
women) 
Corporate reputation 
and corporate social 
responsibility 
51 Fortune 2009 
world’s most 
admired companies 
– US 
 
Cross-sectional, 
archival 
CSR mediated the relationship between 
gender diversity and reputation 
Bohren and 
Strom (2010) 
Gender 
(Proportion) 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROS About 1200 
observations of  
Norwegian firms 
 
Panel data 1989-2002, 
archival 
Negative relationship between gender 
diversity and all three performance 
measures 
Bonn (2004) Age (average 
age), gender 
(ratios of 
women) 
 
Return on equity, 
market-to-book value 
ratio 
84 Australian 
manufacturing 
organizations 
Four years time lag, 
archival 
Positive relationship between ratio of 
female directors and market-to-book value, 
non-significant effects of age diversity   
Bonn et al.(2004) Age (average 
age), gender 
(ratios of 
women) 
Return on assets, 
market-to-book value 
ratio 
169 Japanese 
manufacturing 
organizations, and 
104 Australian 
manufacturing 
organizations 
 
One year time lag, 
archival 
Japanese firms: negative relationship 
between average age and market-to-book 
value for Japanese firms (equivalent to a 
positive relationship between age diversity 
and market-to-book value, non-significant 
effects of gender diversity  
Australian firms: positive relationship 
between gender diversity and market-to-
book value, non-significant effects of age 
diversity  
 
Campbell and 
Minguez-Vera 
(2004) 
Gender 
(Percentage, 
Blau, Shannon 
index)  
Tobin’s Q 68 Spanish 
organizations with 
408 observations 
Panel data 1995-2000, 
archival 
Support for a positive relationship 
Dobbin and Jung 
(2011) 
Gender 
(Number of 
women) 
Stock value, profits 432 US firms Cross-sectional, 
archival 
Female directors have negative effects on 
stock vale and no effects on profits 
 
Hafsi and Turgut 
(2013) 
Gender, age 
(indices) 
Corporate social 
performance 
US 95 S&P 500 
firms  
Cross-sectional (Year 
2005), archival 
Gender diversity has positive and age 
diversity has negative effect on corporate 
social performance 
Haslam et al. 
(2010) 
Gender 
(Percentage) 
ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q UK FTSE 100 
organizations 
2001-2005 panel data, 
archival 
No relationship with accounting measures 
(ROA and ROE) and negative relationship 
with market measures (Tobin's Q) 
Mahadeo et al. 
(2012) 
Gender 
(proportion of 
women), age 
(categories) 
 
ROA 42 Mauritian 
organizations 
Cross-sectional, 
archival 
Support for a positive relationship between 
diversity (gender and age) and ROA 
Nguyen and Faff 
(2006) 
Gender 
(number of 
women) 
Tobin’s Q, ROA 500 largest 
Australian 
organizations, 793 
final observations 
Panel data 2000 and 
2001 
Support for a positive relationship between 
gender diversity and Tobin’s Q 
Siciliano (1996)  Gender 
(proportions),  
age 
(categories) 
Operating efficiency, 
social performance, 
level of donations  
240 US YMCA 
organizations 
Cross-sectional, 
survey 
Gender: positive with social performance, 
negative with level of donations 
Age: positive with level of donations 
 
Srinidhi et al. 
(2011) 
Gender Earnings quality US organizations, 
2,480 firm year 
observations 
Panel data 2001-2007, 
archival 
Positive relationship between female 
participation and earnings quality 
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TABLE 1 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
a
 
 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Controls          
1. Organization size 4719.37 14694.76        
2. Organization age 36.95 33.75 .27**       
3. 
Organization type 
(0 = Holding/subsidiary; 1 = Stand-alone) 
.10 .30 -.09 -.07      
4. 
Industry type 
(0 = Services; 1 = Manufacturing) 
.42 .50 -.05 .09 .10     
Predictors          
5. Age diversity 2011 .12 .06 -.04 -.03 .03 .02    
6. Gender diversity 2011 .17 .17 .22** .25** -.07 -.21** -.10   
Outcomes          
7. Employee productivity 2012 12.44 2.25 .04 .14* -.30** -.12 -.12 .18**  
8. Return on assets 2012 2.85 19.86 .05 .06 -.12* -.14* -.18** .01 .29** 
                          a 
2-tailed; * p<.05, ** p<.01 
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TABLE 2 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analyses – Employee Productivity 2012 
Variable 
Age and gender diversity 
predicting 
employee productivity 
 Hypotheses 1/2 Hypothesis 3 
β (Model 1)b β (Model 2) β (Model 3) 
Controls    
Organization size -.03 -.05 -.05 
Organization age .14* .11 .11 
Organization type -.29*** -.28*** -.28*** 
Industry type -.10 -.07 -.08 
    
Predictors    
Age diversity 2011  -.09 -.08 
Gender diversity 2011  .12* .13* 
    
Squared terms    
Age diversity 2011
 2
   -.03 
Gender diversity 2011
2
   -.04 
    
R
2
 .12 .14 .14 
F 9.28*** 7.49*** 5.70*** 
∆R2 .12 .02 .00 
F for ∆R2 9.28*** 3.58* .42 
    
                                           
a 
n = 288  
                                    
b
 Standardized coefficients are reported                    
                      * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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TABLE 3 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analyses – Return on Assets 2012 
Variable 
Age and gender diversity 
predicting 
return on assets 
 Hypotheses 1/2 Hypothesis 3 
β (Model 1)b β (Model 2) β (Model 3) 
Controls    
Organization size .02 .02 .01 
Organization age .06 .08 .07 
Organization type -.10 -.10 -.10 
Industry type -.13* -.14* -.16** 
    
Predictors    
Age diversity 2011  -.18** -.07 
Gender diversity 2011  -.07 -.08 
    
Squared terms    
Age diversity 2011
 2
   -.22** 
Gender diversity 2011
2
   .01 
    
R
2
 .04 .07 .10 
F 2.55* 3.49** 4.05*** 
∆R2 .04 .03 .03 
F for ∆R2 2.55* 5.23** 5.38** 
    
                                                          
a 
n = 288  
                                          
b 
Standardized coefficients are reported                    
                           * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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FIGURE 1 
Linear gender diversity-employee productivity relationship 
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FIGURE 2 
Linear and curvilinear age diversity-return on assets relationship 
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